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Synthetic biology, a field that aims to “make biology easier to engineer,” is routinely
described as leading to an increase in the “dual-use” threat, i.e., the potential for the
same scientific research to be “used” for peaceful purposes or “misused” for warfare
or terrorism. Fears have been expressed that the “de-skilling” of biology, combined with
online access to the genomic DNA sequences of pathogenic organisms and the reduction
in price for DNA synthesis, will make biology increasingly accessible to people operating
outside well-equipped professional research laboratories, including people with malevolent
intentions. The emergence of do-it-yourself (DIY) biology communities and of the student
iGEM competition has come to epitomize this supposed trend toward greater ease of
access and the associated potential threat from rogue actors. In this article, we identify
five “myths” that permeate discussions about synthetic biology and biosecurity, and argue
that they embody misleading assumptions about both synthetic biology and bioterrorism.
We demonstrate how these myths are challenged by more realistic understandings of the
scientific research currently being conducted in both professional and DIY laboratories,
and by an analysis of historical cases of bioterrorism. We show that the importance of tacit
knowledge is commonly overlooked in the dominant narrative: the focus is on access to
biological materials and digital information, rather than on human practices and institutional
dimensions. As a result, public discourse on synthetic biology and biosecurity tends to por-
tray speculative scenarios about the future as realities in the present or the near future,
when this is not warranted. We suggest that these “myths” play an important role in defin-
ing synthetic biology as a “promissory” field of research and as an “emerging technology”
in need of governance.
Keywords: synthetic biology, biosecurity, bioterrorism, biological weapons, DIY biology, iGEM, policy discourse,
non-proliferation
INTRODUCTION
“Synthetic biology strives to make the engineering of biology
easier and more predictable.” [(1), p. 6]
A dominant narrative has emerged in policy arenas, in which
advances in the biosciences are seen to make biology easier and
more accessible, and this is presumed to increase the so-called
“dual-use” threat, i.e., the potential for the same scientific research
to be “used” for peaceful purposes or “misused” for warfare or ter-
rorism. Developments in synthetic biology, a field that emerged at
the start of the twenty-first century with the stated aim of “making
biology easier to engineer” (1, 2), have further fueled these con-
cerns. Fears have been expressed that synthetic biology will lead to
further “de-skilling” and that, combined with open online access
to the genomic DNA sequences of pathogenic organisms and
the reduction in price for DNA synthesis, this will make biology
increasingly accessible to people operating outside well-equipped
professional research laboratories, including people with malev-
olent intentions. The emergence of do-it-yourself (DIY) biology
communities and the student iGEM competition has come to epit-
omize this supposed trend toward greater ease of access and the
associated potential threat from rogue actors.
In this article, we analyze this dominant narrative and identify
five“myths”that permeate discussions about synthetic biology and
biosecurity. We describe each of these myths and provide illus-
trative examples of how they are deployed in policy arenas. We
then demonstrate how each of these myths is challenged by more
realistic understandings of the scientific research currently being
conducted in both professional and DIY laboratories, and by an
analysis of historical cases of bioterrorism. In particular, we show
that the importance of tacit knowledge is commonly overlooked
in the dominant narrative: the focus is on access to biological
materials and digital information, rather than on human practices
and institutional dimensions. Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley and
Kathleen Vogel have argued, on the basis on their in-depth analysis
of the US and Soviet biowarfare programs, that there are impor-
tant intangible barriers to the proliferation of biological weapons
(3–5). These authors show how tacit knowledge has been margin-
alized in assessments of the dual-use threat of biotechnologies in
the twenty-first century.
Tacit knowledge is crucial to conduct advanced bioscience
research, and is by definition difficult to share. This is encapsu-
lated by Polanyi’s remark that “we can know more than we can
tell” [(6), p. 4, emphasis in original]. As a result, researchers who
work within institutionalized laboratories acquire tacit knowl-
edge through experience, by working in teams and participating
in professional scientific networks. But acquiring tacit knowledge
is much more difficult for people who operate outside of such
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institutions, such as DIY biologists and bioterrorists. Broadly, tacit
knowledge refers to skills and techniques that cannot be readily
codified but, rather, are acquired through a process of “learning
by doing” or “learning by example,” and often take considerable
time and effort to gain. According to Harry Collins, a distinc-
tion can be made between “weak,”“somatic limit,” and “collective”
tacit knowledge (7, 8). Revill and Jefferson (9) have drawn on
Collins’ classification to explore the importance of tacit knowl-
edge in the practice of synthetic biology and the conduct of
bioweapons programs. They explain that “[w]eak tacit knowl-
edge is that which could, under certain circumstances, be rendered
explicit but either through inability, unwillingness, or practicality
remains unwritten and implicit” [(9), p. 3]. Individual, or somatic,
tacit knowledge “refers to things that our bodies can do, which we
cannot articulate, transfer and replicate as knowledge without the
recipient learning by doing” (ibid., p. 4–5). These are the skills,
mechanical techniques, and idiosyncratic know-how obtained by
individuals through trial-and-error problem-solving or through
a master-apprentice style relationship. Collective, or communal,
tacit knowledge “is the combined knowledge that is developed
through interaction between experts with different disciplinary
backgrounds working together” (ibid., p. 6). This can be concep-
tualized “as the bringing together of different disciplinary experts
that are greater than the sum of their parts” (ibid., p. 6–7), or,
following Vogel (10), can be understood as “communally synthe-
sized tacit knowledge” that comes from the ongoing interactions
between different types of expertise. Revill and Jefferson (9) pro-
vide examples of tacit knowledge from each of these categories
from the history of biological weapons programs and the practice
of advanced biological sciences, including synthetic biology.
Ben Ouagrham-Gormley and Vogel, and Revill and Jeffer-
son, argue that a better understanding of tacit knowledge could
improve the assessments of the dual-use threat posed by modern
biotechnologies. Yet, tacit knowledge continues to be overlooked
in policy arenas. In this paper, we examine the way in which the
biosecurity threat posed by synthetic biology has been framed
within the dominant narrative that permeates scientific and pol-
icy arenas. We identify five recurring “myths” that emerge from
this analysis:
• Myth 1: synthetic biology is de-skilling biology and making it
easier for terrorists to exploit advances in the biosciences;
• Myth 2: synthetic biology has led to the growth of a DIY biology
community, which could offer dual-use knowledge, tools, and
equipment for bioterrorists seeking to do harm;
• Myth 3: DNA synthesis has become cheaper and can be out-
sourced, and this will make it easier for terrorists to create
biological threat agents;
• Myth 4: synthetic biology could be used to design radically new
pathogens;
• Myth 5: terrorists want to pursue biological weapons for high
consequence, mass casualty attacks.
The use of the term “myths” is not intended here to imply fal-
sity. We are not simplistically opposing “myth” and “reality,” and
we are not arguing that there is no threat. Rather, our aim is to
convey the pervasiveness of misleading assumptions about both
synthetic biology and bioterrorism that frequently underlie dis-
cussions about the dual-use threat of synthetic biology, and to
draw out some of the subtleties that frequently disappear from
these discussions. Moreover, we do acknowledge that these myths
have power and perform real functions such as mobilizing support,
resources, and action. Thus, the dominant narrative identified in
this paper helps to bring into being a particular hoped-for future,
and attributes roles and influence to different actors. It influences
the way in which the problem is defined, and thus the kinds of
solutions that are proposed. These “myths” are real enough to
influence policy in significant ways and that why it is important to
examine them more carefully.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The research presented here draws on participant observation in
scientific and policy arenas, and on a review of a wide range of
written materials.
All three authors have been participant-observers in either syn-
thetic biology arenas, or biosecurity arenas, or both, for a number
of years. Filippa Lentzos has been regularly attending and actively
participating in a wide range of events on biosecurity, biological
arms control and non-proliferation for over a decade. Cather-
ine Jefferson has been involved in discussions on bioweapons,
biosecurity and arms control for a decade. Claire Marris has been
attending and participating in a wide range of scientific and policy
events on synthetic biology for 5 years. Filippa Lentzos has been
engaged in the field of synthetic biology for the last 7 years. The
synthetic biology events include scientific meetings ranging from
large-scale international conferences such as those in the SBx.0
series to laboratory meetings at the Centre for Synthetic Biology
and Innovation (CSynBI) that all three authors are members of,
or informal conversations with CSynBI and other collaborators in
the field of synthetic biology. Our involvement also includes par-
ticipation in expert committees and working groups, and public
debates organized by scientific organizations.1
The key insights reported in this paper emerged from this
immersion in the worlds of synthetic biology and biosecurity,
which provided the authors with regular opportunities to interact
with synthetic biologists, government officials, security analysts,
technical experts, diplomats, public health officials, law enforce-
ment agents, DIY biologists, and others who have assembled
around the “problem” of synthetic biology “misuse.” These inter-
actions took place in“natural”settings (as opposed to, for example,
an interview setting), in places and during events that these actors –
and the authors – were participating in through the course of their
work.
It is through this fieldwork that we became aware of the preva-
lence of particular ways of framing the issues at stake, and were
able to analyze how actors mobilized particular arguments. This
was complemented by a review of written materials, which has
been utilized mostly to confirm the hypotheses developed through
our fieldwork, and to select citations to illustrate our results. This
was necessary because many of the meetings that we participated
1A list of some of our higher profile engagements can be found here:
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/sshm/research/Research-Labs/CSynBI@
KCL-Impact.aspx.
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in were not public and/or were not recorded, so it is not techni-
cally possible to provide verbatim quotations from those events.
Moreover, in most cases, providing such quotations would not
be compatible with research ethics. The documents reviewed are
mostly from the “gray” literature: reports produced by scientific
and biosecurity institutions. But they also include relevant aca-
demic articles, websites, blogs, and print media. The key criteria
for selection of documents and citations were that they should be
produced or written by key institutions or influential individuals
in the fields of synthetic biology and/or biosecurity, for example:
Drew Endy, Rob Carlson, George Church as leaders in the field of
synthetic biology; Jonathan Tucker, Tara O’Toole, and Laurie Gar-
rett as US experts in the field of biosecurity; Markus Schmidt as
a key European commentator on “ethical, legal, and social issues”
related to synthetic biology; US government officials and politi-
cians; and institutions such as the Biological Weapons Convention
(BWC), the European Commission, the US National Academy of
Science, the US National Research Council, the US National Advi-
sory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), the J. Craig Venter Institute
(JCVI) and the UK Royal Academy of Engineering. Moreover,
the illustrative citations are taken mostly from documents and
from (individual or institutional) authors that are themselves rou-
tinely cited by actors in discussions about synthetic biology and
biosecurity.
Ethnographic data from participant observation and the liter-
ature review was complemented by a 1-day workshop convened
by the authors at King’s College London on 28th February 2014
(11). This workshop brought together a group of 23 scientists,
policy experts, science journalists, and social scientists (mostly
from the UK) with specialist expertise in either synthetic biology
or biosecurity (or both). A draft of the present paper was circu-
lated in advance of the workshop and participants were asked to
comment on it. The comments received and the discussions that
occurred during the workshop provided additional information
and confirmation of our hypotheses.
RESULTS
MYTH 1
Synthetic biology is de-skilling biology and making it easier for
terrorists to exploit advances in the biosciences
Founding leaders in synthetic biology have argued that devel-
opments in the field would lead to a situation where biology
would not only become “easier to engineer,” but that it would
become easier for anyone to engineer biology. For example, dur-
ing his early campaigns to garner political and financial sup-
port for the field, Drew Endy stressed that synthetic biology
would lead to “the probable inability to control the distribu-
tion of technologies needed to manipulate biological systems”
(12). Rob Carlson, in an article published in a biosecurity jour-
nal, emphasized that it would lead to the “inevitable” “prolifer-
ation of skills” [(13), p. 7]. Endy and Carlson both pointed to
potential dual-use threats, whereby the powerful technology that
they were promoting could be misapplied for harmful purposes.
George Church also raised these issues in his “Synthetic Biohazard
Non-proliferation Proposal” (14). The JCVI funded a report on
“Options for Governance” that also focused almost exclusively on
such risks (15).
The idea that synthetic biology could make it easier for non-
specialists, including those working outside of institutions, to
exploit this powerful technology for both benevolent and malevo-
lent purposes, has to a large extent become a hallmark of the field.
For example, in an article entitled “Diffusion of synthetic biol-
ogy: a challenge to biosafety” Markus Schmidt, who was the leader
of the first European Commission-funded project on the “Ethi-
cal, Legal, and Social Issues” of the field (SYNBIOSAFE) and who
has become a prominent commentator on the risks involved, has
argued, in a paper that has been cited 52 times in Google Scholar
(accessed 10th July 2014), that:
With this“de-skilling”agenda, synthetic biology might finally
unleash the full potential of biotechnology and spark a wave
of innovation, as more and more people have the necessary
skills to engineer biology [(16), p. 1].
This portrayal of synthetic biology focuses on the powerful positive
impact that could be “unleashed” by “de-skilling,” and inevitably
leads to concerns that such power could fall into the hands of
people with malevolent intentions. As a result, policy experts have
routinely expressed concerns that synthetic biology could be used
by terrorists to produce biological weapons. For example, political
scientists from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Gautam
Mukunda2 and Kenneth Oye), who were both at the time working
for the US Synthetic Biology Research Center (Synberc), published
an article on synthetic biology and biosecurity in 2009, in which
they stated:
Synthetic biology includes, as a principal part of its agenda,
a sustained, well-funded assault on the necessity of tacit
knowledge in bioengineering and thus on one of the most
important current barriers to the production of biological
weapons [(17), p. 14].
The European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies
to the European Commission also emphasized this in their 2009
Opinion on synthetic biology:
Ethical issues arise particularly from dangers of using syn-
thetic lethal and virulent pathogens for terrorist attacks, bio-
war, or maleficent uses (“garage terrorism”, “bio-hacking”),
particularly if knowledge and skills on how to produce such
pathogens are freely available [(18), p. 43].
Challenges to Myth 1
These concerns are based on the assumption that synthetic biol-
ogy already has made it, or shortly will make it, easy for any-
body to “engineer biology.” The underlying vision is one where
well-characterized biological “parts” can be easily obtained from
open-source online registries and then easily assembled, by people
with no specialist training and working outside professional sci-
entific institutions, into genetic “circuits,”“devices,” and “systems”
that will reliably perform desired functions in live organisms (1,
2). However, this does not even reflect current realities in acade-
mic or commercial science laboratories, where researchers are still
struggling with every stage of this process (19, 20).
2Gautam Mukunda is now at the Harvard Business School.
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Moreover, synthetic biologists who participated in our recent
workshop (11) argued that although historical experience with
other forms of (non-biological) engineering demonstrate that
dependence on the craft skills of a small number of highly trained
individuals is reduced for some parts of the production process,
usually by standardization and mechanization, this does not mean
that skills become irrelevant or that all aspects of the work become
easier. Specialized expertise, teamwork, large infrastructures, com-
plicated machinery, advanced technology, trouble-shooting, and
organizational factors continue to be required when a design and
engineering approach develops. Thus, even though the engineer-
ing approach of synthetic biology aims to make processes more
systematic and more reproducible, this will not make it easier for
anybody to engineer biology. Indeed, some aspects of the work
may become more complex, and new skills may be required.
A useful analogy to aeronautical engineering was used at the
workshop to illustrate this. Planes are built from a large number
of well-characterized parts in a systematic way, but this does not
mean that any member of the general public can build a plane,
make it fly, and use it for commercial transportation. Thus, it is
too simplistic to suggest that if synthetic biology becomes an engi-
neering discipline it will necessarily become easier for anybody
to engineer biological systems, including dangerous ones. More
care needs to be taken in the interpretation of statements about
how synthetic biology will lead to “de-skilling” and “make the
engineering of biology easier.”
Furthermore, the experiences of iGEM teams tend to demon-
strate the challenges of successfully performing synthetic biol-
ogy experiments, and demonstrate the ongoing need for guided
instruction and collective expertise. iGEM is the annual Interna-
tional Genetically Engineered Machine competition, which brings
together undergraduate students from across a range of disciplines
to work collaboratively to design and build biological systems and
operate them in living cells. The iGEM competition is linked to
the parts-based approach to synthetic biology through its contri-
butions to the Registry of Standard Biological Parts, and provides
a proof-of-principle for the synthetic biology agenda (21).
iGEM teams typically receive considerable guidance from
senior faculty members and, while iGEM is a collaborative exercise,
biologically trained students still tend to be the ones who have the
central roles in daily laboratory activity. Balmer and Bulpin (22)
describe the collaborative experiences of one undergraduate iGEM
team:
Over the course of the project, as time pressures became more
significant, it became natural, when assigning the activities
of the day, for them to conduct the procedures in which they
had each become experts, as otherwise it would require them
teaching someone else. [. . .] As one of them explained:“From
the start I had the idea that I would take a main role in mod-
elling but also get some experience in the lab. However, I
quickly gave up on lab work after the first few weeks because
the time frame for the project we had was not enough to learn the
basics needed for the lab and apply them.” Owing to these con-
textual, material specificities of the laboratory and modelling
work, the sub-teams were quickly separated by knowledge, time
and space [(22), p. 14, emphasis added].
Cockerton (23) reported similar findings from her ethnography
of two iGEM teams:
both teams found that many protocols were not streamlined
as descriptions of synthetic biology often present. There was
a great deal of tedious work, which involved small volumes
of clear liquid and lots of waiting time. Many cycles of failed
experiments had to be repeated (p. 306).
[. . .]
the reality of everyday design-experiment-fail-redesign (and
so on. . .) cycles serves as a sobering reminder that the foun-
dations of synthetic biology were not then (when I was in
the field in 2009), and are not yet (2011), stable. Many exper-
iments don’t work out as planned because many BioBricks
from the Registry don’t function reliably. Presently, engi-
neering that is accomplished with BioBricks in one lab and
described in a standard fashion, certainly does not guar-
antee that the same result is reproducible in another lab
(p. 307–308).
These in-depth analyses of synthetic biology in action illustrate
the importance of collective expertise in synthetic biology research
and the challenge posed by tacit knowledge, especially for wet lab
work. Members of iGEM teams have or acquire distinct specialist
sets of knowledge and skills, which are then applied to the collec-
tive project. Training by experienced professional researchers, and
specialist skill sets acquired through trial and error, are still highly
relevant to the success of synthetic biology projects.
The challenge of acquiring the specialist skill sets to perform
laboratory work is also demonstrated by the experiences of some
members of the DIY biology (DIYbio) community. DIYbio.org
describes itself as “an organization dedicated to making biol-
ogy an accessible pursuit for citizen scientists, amateur biologists,
and biological engineers who value openness and safety”3. The
organization comprises over 2000 members globally, although
the actual number of members regularly conducting biological
experimentation is much smaller. Some DIY biologists work in
home laboratories assembled from everyday household tools and
second-hand laboratory equipment purchased online. However,
the majority conduct their experiments in community labs or
“hackerspaces” (24).
DIY biologists typically comprise a wide range of participants
of varying levels of expertise, ranging from complete novices with
no prior background in biology, to trained scientists who conduct
DIY experiments in their own time. The experiences of amateur
DIY biologists demonstrate how a lack of indoctrination in the
practices of biology can present significant challenges. As Revill
and Jefferson (9) note:
For example, the London Biohacker group [. . .] have noted
the challenge of overcoming “pipetting errors” when trying
to optimise techniques for DNA extraction and PCR process.
MadLab, a bio group based at the Manchester Digital Lab-
oratory, experienced similar difficulties during their “PCR
3http://diybio.org/about-2/, accessed 14/07/2014
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challenge,” in which they pitched their home-made Arduino-
based PCR machine against the open-source OpenPCR kit
and the commercial PCR at Manchester Metropolitan Uni-
versity: . . .“the hardest part of the process was getting our
samples into the gel using a micropipette. It turns out there is
a bit of an art to pipetting . . . The more experienced pipettors
claimed that it took them weeks to get the proper technique.”
(p. 6)
Scientists typically build up these skills over the course of their
training, but they present notable challenges for amateurs. Thus,
while representations of Myth 1 imply that the material, informa-
tional aspects of synthetic biology will make it easier for anybody
to exploit this technology to do harm, further examination of the
social dimensions of scientific practice reveal the continued sig-
nificance of local, specialized knowledge, and the importance of
enculturation in laboratory practices.
At the workshop recently convened by the authors, an inter-
esting tension was revealed. On the one hand, if tacit knowledge
remains important in synthetic biology, then this implies that it
will not be easily accessible to outsiders and this reduces concerns
about the dual-use threat. On the other hand, if synthetic biology
is an engineering discipline and if, as stated by Mukunda et al. in
the citation above, this represents “an assault on the necessity of
tacit knowledge” (17), then this implies that it will become more
accessible to outsiders and this increases the dual-use threat. Thus,
biosecurity concerns are heightened when more extreme depic-
tions of synthetic biology’s ability to engineer biology are empha-
sized. We characterize this as the “synthetic biology/engineering
conundrum” (11).
MYTH 2
Synthetic biology has led to the growth of a DIY biology community,
which could offer dual-use knowledge, tools, and equipment for
bioterrorists seeking to do harm
Developments in synthetic biology are seen to be closely associ-
ated with the growth of the DIYbio community, and concerns
are expressed that this could offer knowledge, tools, and equip-
ment to bioterrorists seeking to do harm. This was a key thrust
in Carlson’s 2003 article, which started with the phrase: “The
advent of the home molecular laboratory is not far off.” Schmidt
also stressed this notion in his 2008 article, saying, for example:
“[Imagine] a world where practically anybody with an average IQ
would have the ability to create novel organisms in their home
garage” [(16), p. 2]. This anticipated rise of a form of biology
that could be performed by amateurs in their home garage or
kitchen (25), sometimes referred to as “biohacking,” was under-
standably picked up by biosecurity experts. Jonathan Tucker, a
well-recognized expert on chemical and biological weapons, wrote
several articles on this topic, and in the most widely cited of these
(cited 96 times according to Google Scholar, accessed 07/07/2014),
he said:
The reagents and tools used in synthetic biology will even-
tually be converted into commercial kits, making it easier
for biohackers to acquire them. Moreover, as synthetic biol-
ogy training becomes increasingly available to students at
the college and possibly high-school levels, a “hacker culture”
may emerge, increasing the risk of reckless or malevolent
experimentation [(26), p. 42].
Such concerns became prevalent at the NSABB, an organization
established in 2005 to provide advice to the US government on
biosecurity issues:
As synthetic biology techniques become easier and less expen-
sive and the applications become more widely relevant, the
range of practitioners expands to include scientists from a
variety of disciplines; students at all levels, including high
school; and amateur scientists and hobbyists who may lack
any formal affiliations with universities or research institu-
tions. The diversity of practitioners will also include indi-
viduals of different ages and varied social and educational
backgrounds who may not have been sensitized to the ethical
social and legal norms of the traditional life science research
communities [(27), p. 11].
By 2014, this idea had become so widely accepted among experts
in the field of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
(CBRN) weapons that an article entitled “DIY Bioterrorism Part
II: the proliferation of bioterrorism through synthetic biology”
was posted on the CBRNePortal.com. This article stated that:
The threat may be changing with the continued advance-
ment of synthetic biology applications. Coupled with the
ease of information sharing and a rapidly growing do-it-
yourself-biology (DIYbio) movement, the chances of not only
more attacks but potentially more deadly ones will inevitably
increase (28).
Challenges to Myth 2
The link between synthetic biology and DIYbio, and the level of
sophistication of the experiments typically being performed in
DIYbio community labs, is overstated (24,29). Members of DIYbio
communities who are involved in more sophisticated experiments
tend to be trained biologists, not amateurs and, as noted in the pre-
vious section, the experiences of amateur members of the DIYbio
community demonstrate the challenges posed by tacit knowledge
to successfully conduct even rudimentary biological experiments.
Furthermore, members of the DIYbio community tend to be
proactive in addressing and engaging with safety and security con-
cerns and many community labs have strict rules about access
(24). For example, BioCurious, a community lab in silicon Val-
ley, requires all members working in the wet lab to undertake
a safety orientation, regardless of formal education or previous
laboratory experience. BioCurious also has a safety committee
that reviews requests to work with organisms not already on an
approved list, and can approve, modify, or reject experimental
design4.
DIYbio.org has also been active in promoting responsibil-
ity within the community. For example, in partnership with
the Synthetic Biology Project at the Wilson Center, DIYbio.org
has developed a Draft Code of Ethics that includes a focus on
transparency, safety, and peaceful purpose5. In January 2013,
4http://biocurious.org/faq/, accessed 14/07/2014
5http://diybio.org/codes, accessed 14/07/2014
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DIYbio.org also launched an “Ask a Biosafety Officer” web portal6
in which anyone with a question can submit their query to a panel
of volunteer biosafety experts. DIYbio Europe has established a
set of Community Lab Safety Guidelines, with an emphasis on
communication, openness, lab organization, and user and envi-
ronmental safety (30). The US Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) weapons of mass destruction outreach program has also
launched a series of efforts to promote outreach and oversight of
the DIYbio community (31).
MYTH 3
DNA synthesis has become cheaper and can be out-sourced, and
this will make it easier for terrorists to create biological threat
agents
DNA synthesis is one of the key enabling technologies of syn-
thetic biology. There are now a number of commercial companies
that provide DNA synthesis services, so the process can be out-
sourced: a client can order a DNA sequence online and receive
the synthesized DNA material by post within days or weeks. The
price charged by these companies has greatly reduced over the
last 20 years, and is now around 0.3 US$ per base pair, which
puts it within reach of a broad range of actors. This has led to
routine statements suggesting that it is now cheap and easy to
obtain a synthesized version of any desired DNA sequence. This
popularized image of DNA synthesis is well represented by the
Wikipedia entry (accessed 02/07/2014) for “artificial gene synthe-
sis,” which states that: “it is possible to make a completely synthetic
double-stranded DNA molecule with no apparent limits on either
nucleotide sequence or size.”
Rob Carlson first published his now famous “Carlson curves,”
illustrating the increasing productivity and reducing cost of DNA
synthesis, in an article in the journal Biosecurity and Bioterrorism,
which focused on how to combat the “potential for mischief or
mistake” associated with advances in biological technologies (13).
This illustrates how synthetic biology was, early on, promoted
alongside discussions of a related biosecurity threat.
The key concern raised has been that bioterrorists could create
dangerous viruses or other pathogens “from scratch,” meaning
without access to the biological material from nature, from a
strain repository, or from a laboratory. Instead, they would start
with DNA or RNA genomic sequences for pathogenic viruses and
bacterial pathogens that are increasingly freely available online.
Such fears were heightened in 2002 by an experiment in which
poliovirus was synthesized without the use of any natural virus
or viral components (32). The research team, led by Eckard
Wimmer, obtained published poliovirus RNA genome sequence
information and converted this into DNA sequence data, which
they then ordered from a commercial DNA synthesis company
and assembled into a viral genome. The DNA was converted
back into RNA and the RNA was used to produce a functional
virus. Publication of this research in a scientific journal arti-
cle immediately raised concerns that terrorists could use it as
a recipe to synthesize dangerous viruses without needing access
to biological material. These fears were further fueled when a
6http://ask.diybio.org, accessed 14/07/2014
journalist from The Guardian reported that he had been able
to order online a synthesized DNA fragment from the small-
pox virus genome and have it delivered to a residential address.
According to this journalist, this showed “the ease with which ter-
rorist organizations could obtain the basic ingredients of biological
weapons” (33).
As Garfinkel et al. [(15), pp. 5–6) point out, although these
experiments built upon previous work on DNA synthesis, “Wim-
mer’s work demonstrated for the first time in a post-September 11
world the feasibility of synthesizing a complete microorganism, in
this case, a human pathogen – using only published DNA sequence
information and mail-ordered raw materials.” Such concerns were
further crystallized when, the following year, researchers at the
JCVI similarly synthesized the bacteriophage phiX174 (a virus that
infects bacteria) (34), and when researchers at the US Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention “reconstructed” the Spanish flu
virus (35), thought to have killed around 50 million people during
the 1918 pandemic (36). This demonstrated that even viruses that
could not otherwise be easily obtained in nature or from labora-
tory collections could be recreated (by well-resourced university
researchers).
Together, the reconstruction of poliovirus and Spanish
influenza virus have come to epitomize the threat narrative that
DNA synthesis has become faster and cheaper, and that this will
make it easier for terrorists to create biological threat agents. This is
illustrated by statements from biosecurity experts such as Jonathan
Tucker and Raymond Zilinskas7:
One potential misuse of synthetic biology would be to recre-
ate known pathogens (such as the Ebola virus) in the lab-
oratory as a means of circumventing the legal and physical
controls on access to “select agents” that pose a bioterrorism
risk. Indeed, the feasibility of assembling an entire, infectious
viral genome from a set of synthetic oligonucleotides has
already been demonstrated for poliovirus and the Spanish
influenza virus [(26), p. 37].
Another article published in 2007 by Stephen Maurer and Laurie
Zoloth stated that8:
Synthetic biologists have already shown how terrorists could
obtain life forms that now exist only in carefully guarded facil-
ities, such as polio and 1918 influenza samples [(37), p. 16].
In an early article highlighting this concern, security analysts from
the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Strategies wrote:
An editorial in a prestigious scientific journal reporting on
the successful decoding and manipulation of the genetic
sequence of the influenza A virus noted that “one can only
7Jonathan B. Tucker was at this time a senior fellow at the Center for Nonprolif-
eration Studies (CNS) of the Monterey Institute of International Studies, where
he specialized in biological and chemical weapons issues. Raymond Zilinskas was
and still is the director of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation
Program at CNS.
8Stephen Maurer was then and still is at the University of California-Berkeley’s
Goldman School of Public Policy and Director of the Goldman School Project on
Information Technology and Homeland Security. Laurie Zoloth was and still is
Professor of Bioethics at Northwestern University.
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speculate as to how quickly our knowledge. . ..will progress,
now that every nucleotide of the viral genome can be mutated
and engineered back into the genome, in nearly endless
combinations with other mutations.” [. . .] Using such tech-
nologies, which have been utilized to investigate Ebola, pan-
demic flu, influenza, hanta viruses, lassa, rabies, and Marburg
viruses, there is no need for a bioweaponeer to isolate the virus
from an infected patient, acquire it from a germ bank, or cul-
ture it from nature. All the required starting materials, such
as cell lines and DNA synthesizers, are widely available and
used for many beneficent purposes. And the sequences for a
growing variety of viruses that infect humans, animals and
plants, including Ebola, pandemic influenza, and smallpox,
are published in the open literature [(38), p. 30].
Tara O’Toole, Director of the Johns Hopkins Center for Civil-
ian Biodefense Strategies and co-author of the article, was also
the principal author of “Operation Dark Winter” (in 2001-2002)
and “Atlantic Storm” (2005), the disaster response exercises that
simulated covert outbreaks of smallpox in the United States. She
went on to become Under Secretary of the Science and Technol-
ogy Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security and,
on the 10-year anniversary of the “anthrax letters,” reiterated her
Johns Hopkins group’s earlier concerns with synthetic biology in
testimony to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs:
More than a decade ago, the Defense Science Board affirmed
that, “there are no technical barriers to a large-scale bioat-
tack.” We are living in the midst of a biotechnology rev-
olution where the knowledge and tools needed to acquire
and disseminate a biological weapon are increasingly acces-
sible. It is possible today to manipulate pathogens’ charac-
teristics (e.g., virulence, antibiotic resistance), and even to
synthesize viruses from scratch. These procedures will inex-
orably become simpler and more available across the globe
as technology continues to mature (39).
Concerns about terrorist use of DNA synthesis to create biological
weapons spread internationally, and synthetic biology has become
a regular feature of the science and technology reviews of the inter-
national treaty banning biological weapons: the BWC. In one of
these reviews for BWC members, the Chinese delegation noted
that:
With the spread of synthetic biology, some small scale
research groups and even some individuals are now able
to make the deadly Ebola and smallpox viruses and even
some viruses against which all drugs are ineffective, thus
making it much harder to counter bioterrorism. Further-
more, it has become much easier to obtain sensitive informa-
tion. Using publicly available DNA sequences, terrorists can
quickly synthesize pathogenic microbes that had previously
been eradicated. [(40), p. 4].
During a 2012 Meeting of Experts of the BWC, the US delegation
noted that:
These technologies [enabling technologies, including high-
throughput systems for sequencing, synthesizing and ana-
lyzing DNA; bioinformatics and computational tools; and
systems biology] could potentially be used for purposes con-
trary to the Convention, including making pathogens or
toxins easier and less expensive to manufacture de novo, and
further into the future, enabling development of biological
weapons agents designed to evade countermeasures or target
certain human populations [(41), p. 1-2].
Similar concerns have also been highlighted by individual
bioweapons experts. Recent examples include Laurie Garrett’s9
article in the November/December 2013 issue of Foreign Affairs
(42), which was widely disseminated and became the subject of a
“Foreign Affairs Focus” video interview with the author published
online on 15th January 201410. In this article Garrett asserts that:
All the key barriers to the artificial synthesis of viruses and
bacteria have been overcome, at least on a proof-of-principle
basis (42).
Another example is the article written by Adam Bernier and Patrick
Rose for the CBRNePortal, which states:
Non-state actors who wish to employ biological agents for ill
intent are sure to be aware of how tangible bio-weapons are
becoming as applications of synthetic biology become more
affordable and the probability of success increases with each
scientific breakthrough (28).
Synthetic biologists have not sought to deny these risks, and have
led several initiatives to consider how these potential biosecu-
rity risks could best be addressed. These initiatives re-enforced
the association between synthetic biology, DNA synthesis, and
biosecurity threats. For example in his “Synthetic Biohazard
Non-proliferation Proposal,” George Church stated:
While the likelihood of misuse of oligos to gain access to
nearly extinct human viruses (e.g. polio) or novel pathogens
(like IL-4-poxvirus) is small, the consequences loom larger
than chemical and nuclear weapons, since biohazards are
inexpensive, can spread rapidly world-wide and evolve on
their own (14).
Similarly, the JCVI report mentioned above concluded that:
today, any synthesis of viruses, even very small or relatively
simple viruses, remains relatively difficult. In the near future,
however, the risk of nefarious use will rise because of the
increasing speed and capability of the technology and its
widening accessibility. [. . .] Ten years from now, it may be eas-
ier to synthesize almost any pathogenic virus than to obtain
it through other means [(15), p. 12–13].
And a group of synthetic biologists (including Drew Endy and
George Church) published, together with leading DNA synthesis
companies and four FBI staff, a commentary in Nature Biotech-
nology on “DNA synthesis and biological security,” which stated
that:
9Laurie Garrett is a science writer with a special interest in emerging infectious dis-
eases, global health and biosecurity. She works at the Council on Foreign Relations
Council, a think-tank that publishes the journal Foreign Affairs.
10http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/audio-video/foreign-affairs-focus-
laurie-garrett-on-synthetic-biology
www.frontiersin.org August 2014 | Volume 2 | Article 115 | 7
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jefferson et al. Synthetic biology and biosecurity: challenging the “myths”
Like any powerful technology, DNA synthesis has the poten-
tial to be purposefully misapplied. Misuse of DNA-synthesis
technology could give rise to both known and unforeseeable
threats to our biological safety and security [(43), p. 627].
Challenges to Myth 3
When speaking about DNA synthesis, it is useful to distinguish
between (a) the synthesis of oligonucleotides, commonly referred
to as “oligos,” which are typically less than 100 nucleotides in
length; (b) “gene synthesis,” a term used to refer to the de novo syn-
thesis of “gene-length” DNA sequences, typically 200–3,000 base
pairs (bp); and (c) the assembly of de novo synthesized gene-length
fragments into genetic circuits and whole genomes.
There are a number of ways in which DNA synthesis could be
used to create a synthetic viral genome [(44), p. 134]. An entire
viral genome could be ordered online from a commercial gene syn-
thesis company. Short, single stranded oligonucleotides could also
be ordered from different gene synthesis companies and “stitched”
together to create a complete viral genome. Alternatively, oligonu-
cleotides could be synthesized using a purchased or custom-built
DNA synthesizer, and these fragments could then be assembled
into a complete viral genome. Several challenges should be taken
into account when assessing the potential for this technology to be
misused.
Ordering short oligos and then assembling them into a genome
was the method used in the polio and Spanish flu experiments,
but this required specialist expertise, experience, and equipment,
which were all available in the academic laboratories involved but
would not be easily accessible to an amateur working from home.
Obtaining the oligos (as was done by The Guardian journalist for
the smallpox virus) is only the first step in a complicated process.
This is the first challenge to Myth 3.
The second challenge to Myth 3 is that, contrary to what is stated
in Wikipedia, and what is often implied in the policy discourse
described above, even specialized DNA synthesis companies can-
not easily synthesize de novo any desired DNA sequence. Several
commercial companies provide routine gene synthesis services for
sequences under 3,000 bp, but length is a crucial factor, the process
is error prone, and some sequences are recalcitrant to chemical
synthesis (those that are“complex,”have high GC content, or result
in the expression of particular proteins when cloned). Thus, in a
recent review of large-scale de novo DNA synthesis, Kosuri and
Church conclude that:
Today, reconstructions of complete viral and bacterial
genomes are testaments of how far our synthetic capabili-
ties have come. Despite the improvements, our ability to read
DNA is better than our ability to write it [(45), p. 499].
The polio and phi174 viruses both have relatively small genomes,
but these are still 7,400 and 5,400 bp, respectively. Thus, several de
novo synthesized DNA fragments would have to be assembled in
order to produce a full genome and (even if this was not already
regulated by voluntary guidelines adopted by DNA synthesis com-
panies) it would not be possible to simply order the full-length
genome sequence of a small virus online.
The third challenge is that for sequences longer than 5–10 kb,
assembly of DNA fragments becomes the crucial step, not de novo
DNA synthesis. This was the major technological feat in the work
conducted at the JCVI that produced the “synthetic” bacterial
genome, and the “Gibson Assembly method” developed for that
project is now widely used. The description of that work, however,
demonstrates how the assembly of smaller fragments into larger
ones and eventually into a functioning genome required sub-
stantial levels of expertise and resources, including those needed
to conduct trouble-shooting experiments to identify and cor-
rect errors when assembled DNA constructs did not perform as
expected (46).
The fourth challenge to Myth 3 relates to cost. The price of gene
synthesis has declined greatly over the last 20 years, and the policy
discourse that underlies biosecurity fears often implies that it will
naturally become even cheaper over time, and thus widely afford-
able. The decline in price has, however, more or less stagnated
around 0.3 US$ per base pair since 2008; and Carlson (47), Kosuri
and Church (45), and Shetty (48) each discuss reasons why invest-
ment in this area may not be sufficient or well directed enough to
generate further significant advances.
The fifth and fundamental challenge to Myth 3 is that con-
structing a genome size DNA fragment is not the same as creating
a functional genome. In particular, ensuring the desired expres-
sion of viral proteins is a complex challenge, which has been well
documented in Vogel’s (5) account of the 2002 poliovirus synthesis
experiment. Drawing on interviews with the researchers involved
in the experiment,Vogel found that making HeLa cell-free extracts
was a crucial step in translating the synthetic genome into infec-
tious virus particles; and it was also one of the most difficult parts
of the experiment. Successful preparation of the HeLa cell-free
extracts depended on craft-like techniques that require specialized
and localized know-how. Yet, as Vogel notes, despite the difficulties
encountered in this step of the process, published protocols of the
experiment give no indication of this contingency:
As this case study illustrates, successful replication of the
published 2002 poliovirus experiment hinges not only on
the availability of the genetic sequence of the virus, com-
mercial pieces of DNA, or the posting of the publication on
the internet but also on the ability to master the mundane
yet idiosyncratic biological techniques and adhere to specific
laboratory disciplines [(5), p. 86].
Published accounts of science imply that experiments are readily
replicable and transferrable from one lab to the next, but Vogel’s
analysis demonstrates the significance of tacit knowledge in scien-
tific practice and how this would limit the “proliferation” of skills
anticipated in the dominant narrative on synthetic biology. Rec-
ognizing the importance of such tacit knowledge would enable
more refined analyses of the potential biosecurity threat posed by
advances in DNA synthesis technologies.
Additional challenges to Myth 3 include the fact that while DNA
or RNA sequence data are available for many pathogenic viruses,
genomes published in publicly available databases can contain
errors or may be derived from attenuated laboratory strains (49).
Producing viral particles in a laboratory is, moreover, not the same
as creating and deploying an effective biological weapon. Chal-
lenges to the processes of scaling up, storage, and developing a
suitable dissemination method are discussed under Myth 5.
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MYTH 4
Synthetic biology could be used to design radically new pathogens
In addition to recreating dangerous viruses, concerns have also
been expressed that synthetic biology could be used to enhance
the virulence or increase the transmissibility of known pathogens
in order to create novel threat agents.
The 2001 mousepox experiment is the most widely cited exam-
ples of the dual-use potential of life science research and has come
to epitomize the potential to create more virulent viruses. In this
experiment, researchers inserted the gene for interleukin-4 into the
mousepox virus (50). They aimed to produce an altered virus that
would induce infertility in mice and serve as an infectious contra-
ceptive for pest control. However, the altered virus was found to
be lethal to mice. Moreover, and most surprisingly, it was lethal
to mice that were naturally resistant to mousepox as well as to
mice that had been recently immunized against ordinary mouse-
pox. The publication of these findings led to concerns that they
could provide instructions to terrorists to produce novel biological
weapons.
An early, formative report that shaped concerns about radically
new pathogens was Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism
from the US National Research Council. It noted:
The effects of naturally occurring pathogens are limited
by the evolutionary advantage gained by not eliminating
their hosts. Among the many implications of the anticipated
progress in biotechnology is the presumption that it may be
feasible to create novel biological agents that are far more pre-
dictable and dangerous than any of the naturally occurring
pathogens that have been developed as biological weapons
in the past. It may be difficult to engineer a more successful
pathogen than those already present in nature that have been
perfected by evolution for their niche in life. However, appli-
cation of the new genetic technologies makes the creation
of “designer diseases” and pathogens with increased military
utility more likely [(51), p. 25].
These concerns have been echoed in a number of other high profile
reports. For example, the very first European Commission report
dedicated to synthetic biology, published in 2007, stated that:
The possibility of designing a new virus or bacterium “à la
carte” could be used by bioterrorists to create new resistant
pathogenic strains or organisms, perhaps even engineered to
attack genetically specific sub-populations [(52), p. 18].
A 2012 report from United Nations Interregional Crime and
Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) raised similar concerns:
Experts felt that as an enabling tool, synthetic biology [. . .]
would in the long term likely facilitate the work of those
attempting to acquire and use biological weapons. More dan-
gerous and controllable pathogens could be engineered that
lead to novel possibilities in designing bioweapons. Advances
in modeling could enable improvements in weapons design.
Metabolic engineering might confer new qualities and attrib-
utes upon agents and offer options for new types of
weapons. [. . .] This could have the negative effect of mak-
ing bioweapons cheaper and easier to acquire, making their
use eventually more likely; more reliable and controllable,
making them more desirable; and more effective, increasing
their potential impact [(53), p. 34].
These concerns are also evident in the statements made by the
Chinese and US delegations in the BWC reports identified under
Myth 3.
Influential experts have also highlighted concerns about“super-
pathogens,” for instance Marc Collett, a virologist who was com-
missioned by the JCVI to provide advice for their work on the risks
and benefits of synthetic genomics, concluded that:
While nature has provided would-be terrorists an ample sup-
ply and selection of quite virulent viruses, there is concern
that genetic technologies will be used to modify these already
pathogenic agents and create “super-pathogens,” viruses that
are more lethal and disruptive than naturally occurring
pathogens, and that are designed to evade vaccines or to be
resistant to drugs [(54), p. 95].
Maurer and Zoloth, in the article mentioned above, similarly stated
that:
Synthetic biology’s efforts to reprogram life have raised con-
cerns in some quarters that the technology could one day be
used to make radically new weapons, such as pathogens that
could be narrowly targeted towards populations with known
genetic susceptibilities [(37), p. 16].
Laurie Garrett, in her 2013 article for Foreign Affairs, raised her
concerns as follows:
a simple, ubiquitous microbe such as E. coli, a bacterium that
resides in the guts of every human being, can now be trans-
formed into a killer germ capable of wreaking far more havoc
than anything on [the US National Select Agent] registry (42).
The 2011–2012 controversy over publication of H5N1 “bird-flu”
research also centered on concerns that the published research
would provide “blueprints” to terrorists to create highly virulent
viruses with increased transmissibility. H5N1 does not spread
easily from human to human, but it kills between 30 and 80%
of people infected (55). In this experiment, researchers in the
Netherlands and the US independently developed a novel strain
of the H5N1 avian influenza virus that could spread more easily
to humans and other mammals. They passed H5N1 among ferrets
and found that a mutated H5N1 virus that was air transmissi-
ble could emerge, and that this variant was still highly virulent.
When two papers relating similar experimental results were sub-
mitted for publication to Science and Nature, concerns were raised
about the dual-use risk and the NSABB recommended against
full publication of the study. After additional consultations at the
World Health Organization, the NSABB reversed its position and
recommended publication of revised versions of the papers (56).
Challenges to Myth 4
The mousepox and H5N1 experiments are frequently cited to
demonstrate how dangerous new pathogens could be designed.
However, assessments of this threat tend to overlook the fact that,
in both these experiments, the researchers did not actually design
the pathogens. With respect to H5N1, researchers had indeed been
trying to design an air-transmissible virus variant for some time,
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without success. The ferret experiment was set up as an alternative
approach, to see whether “natural” mutations could generate an
air-transmissible variant. The researchers had no influence on the
specific mutations induced. In the IL4 mousepox experiment, the
results were unanticipated by the researchers. In other words, they
were not planned for.
Moreover, some of the key lessons that came out of the exten-
sive Soviet program to weaponize biological agents were about the
trade-offs between improving characteristics that are “desired,”
in the context of a bioweapons program, such as virulence, and
diminishing other equally “desired” characteristics, like transmis-
sibility or stability. One project, for example, aimed to develop
strains of F. tularensis (which causes tularemia) that were resistant
to current vaccines and to multiple antibiotics. Genes coding for
antibiotic resistance were successfully transferred into F. tularen-
sis, but the new strain lost its virulence. Domaradsky, who led the
research, wrote:
Everyone who has ever dealt with the genetics of bacteria
knows how complicated it is to produce a new strain, indeed,
to create a new species! [quoted in (57), p. 186)].
The Soviets did, however, eventually succeed in developing a
strain of F. tularensis that was resistant to multiple antibiotics and
retained its pathogenic characteristics. They also worked on four
additional bacterial strains – B. anthracis (which causes anthrax),
B. mallei (glanders), B. pseudomallei (melioidosis), and Y. pestis
(plague) – with the goal of making each of them resistant to 10
antibiotics, but this proved too technically difficult. As Leitenberg
and Zilinskas note in their account of the process:
The most difficult problems had to do with pleiotropic effects
and a lack of stability in engineered strains. Antibiotic-
resistant cells had a distressing habit of losing virulence or
exhibiting lesser yields (or both) when propagated in cul-
ture. As for stability [. . .] when the construct for resistance
to one antibiotic was introduced into the host cell, an ear-
lier emplaced construct was often lost. This sort of problem
required additional rounds of research,which were both labor
intensive and time consuming [(57), p. 188].
Pleiotropic effects (where a single gene affects more than one char-
acteristic) and genetic instability are common in microorganisms,
and while it is too simple to say that increased transmissibility
will always be associated with reduced virulence, this is often the
case for strains produced in laboratories. In the case of viruses,
this is in part because the production of virus molecules necessi-
tates passage through a series of host organisms, and that during
this scaling-up process the virus is not subject to any evolutionary
pressure to maintain virulence, and thus – although this cannot be
taken as a definitive rule – the virus tends to accumulate mutations
that generate an attenuated strain. Similarly, bacteria cultured in
laboratories will tend to lose virulence.
MYTH 5
Terrorists want to pursue biological weapons for high
consequence, mass casualty attacks
Underlying the first four myths are certain assumptions about
who the terrorists might actually be, what their intentions are,
what capabilities they might pursue, and the level of skills and
resources available to them. Despite a lack of analysis of the poten-
tial adversaries involved in the misuse of life science research, the
bioterrorism threat has generally been portrayed in policy circles
as an imminent concern, and emphasis is placed on high conse-
quence, mass casualty attacks, performed with “weapons of mass
destruction” (WMD).
For example, in one of the President George W. Bush’s earli-
est statements following 9/11 and the “anthrax letter” attacks that
drew the American people’s attention to the biological weapons
threat, he said:
Since September 11, America and others have been con-
fronted by the evils these [biological] weapons can inflict.
This threat is real and extremely dangerous. Rogue states
and terrorists possess these weapons and are willing to use
them (58).
Later, he set up a WMD Commission and tasked it with examining
the threat posed by the nexus of international terrorism and the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In its report, this
Commission asserted:
Unless the world community acts decisively and with great
urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass
destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the
world by the end of 2013. The Commission further believes
that terrorists are more likely to be able to obtain and use
a biological weapon than a nuclear weapon. The Commis-
sion believes that the U.S. government needs to move more
aggressively to limit the proliferation of biological weapons
and reduce the prospect of a bioterror attack [(59), p. xv].
Bioterrorism became one of the Bush Administration’s key secu-
rity concerns over its two terms in office. One estimate of civilian
biodefense expenditure across the federal government since 2001
is that more than $70 billion have been spent (60). Despite this,
on the 10-year anniversary of 9/11 and the “anthrax letter” attacks,
the former US senators who chaired the WMD Commission, Bob
Graham and Jim Talent, released a “report card” on America’s bio-
response capabilities that concluded the US was still unprepared
to respond to large-scale biological attacks. It also warned:
Naturally occurring disease remains a serious biological
threat; however, a thinking enemy armed with these same
pathogens — or with multi-drug-resistant or synthetically
engineered pathogens — could produce catastrophic conse-
quences. A small team of individuals with graduate training
in several key disciplines, using equipment readily avail-
able for purchase on the Internet could produce the type
of bioweapons created by nation-states in the 1960s. Even
more troubling, the rapid advances in biotechnology, such
as synthetic biology, will allow non-state actors to produce
increasingly powerful bioweapons in the future [(61), p. 11].
We see here how the myths we previously discussed, about de-
skilling and increased access, and about the ease of designing new
dangerous pathogens, underlie concerns about terrorists’ potential
ability to launch a mass attack, and how these are connected, by
actors, with the advent of synthetic biology.
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The senators were not alone in their assessments. For instance,
the US Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist made a similar warning in
an earlier speech outlining the global threat of infectious disease
and bioterrorism, and the need to better prepare the US and the
world to respond to epidemics and outbreaks:
No intelligence agency, no matter how astute, and no mili-
tary, no matter how powerful and dedicated, can assure that a
few technicians of middling skill using a few thousand dollars
worth of readily available equipment in a small and appar-
ently innocuous setting cannot mount a first-order biological
attack . . . Never have we had to fight such a battle, to protect
so many people against so many threats that are so silent and
so lethal (62).
Similar messages were reinforced at the highest level. Addressing
BWC members at their five-yearly meeting in 2011, Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton said:
The advances in science and technology make it [. . .] eas-
ier for states and non-state actors to develop biological
weapons. A crude, but effective, terrorist weapon can be made
by using a small sample of any number of widely avail-
able pathogens, inexpensive equipment, and college-level
chemistry and biology (63).
She also acknowledged, however, that not everyone in the interna-
tional community shared the US assessment:
I know there are some in the international community who
have their doubts about the odds of a mass biological attack or
major outbreak. They point out that we have not seen either
so far, and conclude the risk must be low. But that is not the
conclusion of the United States, because there are warning
signs, and they are too serious to ignore (63).
The belief that the focus should be on mass attacks was bluntly
stated by an FBI agent at a symposium on synthetic biology this
year (1st May), when she warned: “These technologies do not just
pose a risk to individual buildings or cities, but if cleverly deployed,
can reduce our population by significant percentages” (64).
Challenges to Myth 5
There are two dimensions to Myth 5. The first is about the inten-
tion of would-be terrorists, and the assumption is that terrorists
would seek to produce mass casualty weapons and pursue capa-
bilities on the scale of twentieth century state-level bioweapons
programs. While most leading biological disarmament and non-
proliferation experts believe that the risk of a small-scale bioter-
rorism attack is very real and very present, they consider the
risk of sophisticated large-scale bioterrorism attacks to be very
small (65). This is backed up by historical evidence. The three
confirmed attempts to use biological agents against humans in
terrorist attacks in the past were small-scale, low casualty events
aimed at causing panic, and disruption rather than excessive death
tolls: (i) the Rajneesh cult’s use of Salmonella on salad bars in local
restaurants to sicken potential voters and make them stay away
from the polls during Oregon elections in 1984; (ii) the 1990–95
attempted use of botulinum toxin and anthrax by the Japanese
Aum Shinrikyo cult; (iii) and the “anthrax letters” sent to media
outlets and members of US Congress in 2001 resulting in at least
22 cases of anthrax, five of which were fatal (66, 67).
The second dimension to Myth 5 is the implicit assumption that
producing a pathogenic organism equates producing a weapon
of mass destruction. It does not. Considerable knowledge and
resources are necessary for the processes of scaling up, storage,
and developing a suitable dissemination method. These processes
present significant technical and logistical barriers. Drawing from
her in-depth study of the Iraqi, Soviet, and US bioweapons
programs (3, 4), Ben Ouagrham-Gormley explains:
Scaling up fragile microorganisms that are sensitive to envi-
ronmental conditions and susceptible to change — and
viruses are more sensitive than bacteria — has been one of
the stiffest challenges for past bioweapons programs to over-
come, even with appropriate expertise at hand. Scaling-up
requires a gradual approach, moving from laboratory sam-
ple, to a larger laboratory quantity, to pilot-scale production,
and then to even larger-scale production. During each stage,
the production parameters need to be tested and often mod-
ified to maintain the lethal qualities of the agent; the entire
scaling-up process can take several years (68).
The dissemination of biological agents also poses difficult technical
challenges. Whereas persistent chemical agents such as sulfur mus-
tard and VX nerve gas are readily absorbed through the intact skin,
no bacteria and viruses can enter the body via that route unless
the skin has already been broken. Biological agents must either
be ingested or inhaled to cause infection. To expose large num-
bers of people through the gastrointestinal tract, possible means
of delivery are contamination of food and drinking water, yet nei-
ther of these scenarios would be easy to accomplish. Large urban
reservoirs are usually unguarded, but unless terrorists added mas-
sive quantities of biological agent, the dilution effect would be so
great that no healthy person drinking the water would receive an
infectious dose (66). Moreover, modern sanitary techniques such
as chlorination and filtration are designed to kill pathogens from
natural sources and would probably be equally effective against
a deliberately released agent. Bacterial contamination of the food
supply is also unlikely to inflict mass casualties. Cooking, boiling,
pasteurization, and other routine safety precautions are generally
sufficient to kill pathogenic bacteria.
The most likely way to inflict mass casualties with a biological
agent is by disseminating it as a respirable aerosol: an invisible
cloud of infectious droplets or particles so tiny that they remain
suspended in the air for long periods and can be inhaled by large
numbers of people. A high-concentration aerosol of B. anthracis or
some other pathogen, released into the air in a densely populated
urban area, could potentially infect thousands of victims simul-
taneously. After an incubation period of a few days, depending
on the type of agent and the inhaled dose, the exposed popula-
tion would experience an outbreak of an incapacitating or fatal
illness. Although aerosol delivery is potentially the most lethal way
of delivering a biological attack, it involves major technical hur-
dles that most terrorists would be unlikely to overcome. To infect
through the lungs, infectious particles must be microscopic in
size – between 1 and 5µm in diameter. Terrorists would therefore
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have to develop or acquire a sophisticated delivery system capa-
ble of generating an aerosol cloud with the necessary particle size
range and a high enough agent concentration to cover a broad area.
Overall, an important trade-off exists between ease of production
and effectiveness of dissemination. The easiest way to produce
microbial agents is in a liquid form, yet when such a “slurry” is
sprayed into the air, it forms heavy droplets that fall to the ground
so that only a small percentage of the agent is aerosolized. In con-
trast, if the bacteria are first dried to a solid cake and then milled
into a fine powder, they become far easier to aerosolize, yet the
drying and milling process is technically difficult.
The Aum Shinrikyo cult struggled with dissemination (67,
69, 70). In one of its anthrax dissemination attempts, it sprayed
unknown, but probably very large, quantities of a liquid aerosol
(most likely crude culture, unprocessed in any way) of B. anthracis
from the roof of the Aum’s headquarters building in Tokyo. For
the dissemination, the Aum set up two sprayers on the roof of the
eight-story building,each within a large round cooling tower. Pipes
were extended from the cooling towers to tanks below, which were
filled with a liquid suspension of B. anthracis. The device worked
poorly, producing large droplets rather than the very fine aerosol
needed for effective transmission of anthrax. It also appears the
spore concentration was very low (at least five orders of magnitude
below that necessary for a highly infectious wet aerosol).
In another dissemination attempt, targeting the area around
the Kanagawa prefectural office and the Imperial Palace, the
Aum equipped vehicles with spraying devices, but according to
prosecutors’ statements, the nozzle of the sprayer clogged and
the operation failed. Despite its 200 m2 laboratory containing,
amongst other equipment, a glove box, incubator, centrifuge, drier,
DNA/RNA synthesizer, electron microscope, two fermenters each
having about a 2,000 litre capacity, and an extensive scientific
library, and despite its repeated attempts at dissemination, the
Aum was unsuccessful in causing any disease, and in retrospect it
is clear that the cult did not even make the first substantive step
toward an effective bioweapon.
If, despite the odds, aerosolization was achieved, the effective
delivery of biological agents in the open air is highly dependent on
atmospheric and wind conditions, creating additional uncertain-
ties. Only under highly stable atmospheric conditions would the
aerosol cloud remain close to the ground where it can be inhaled,
rather than being rapidly dispersed. Moreover, most microorgan-
isms are sensitive to ultraviolet radiation and cannot survive more
than 30 min in bright sunlight, limiting their use to night-time
attacks. One major exception is anthrax, which can be induced to
form spores with tough outer coats that enable them to survive for
several hours in sunlight. Terrorists could, of course, stage a bio-
logical attack inside an enclosed space such as a building, a subway
station, a shopping mall, or a sports arena. Such an attack, if it
involved a respiratory aerosol, might infect thousands of people,
but even here the technical hurdles would by no means be trivial.
Finally, even if a biological weapon had been disseminated
successfully, the outcome of an attack would be affected by fac-
tors like the health of the people who are exposed to the agent,
and the speed and manner with which public health authorities
and medical professionals detected and were able to respond to
the resulting outbreak. A prompt response with effective medical
countermeasures, such as antibodies and vaccination, can signif-
icantly blunt the impact of an attack. Simple, proven ways to
curtail epidemics, such as wearing face masks, hand washing, and
avoiding hospitals where transmission rates might soar, can also
prove effective in stemming the spread of a disease. Indeed, this
aspect of a bioterrorism attack is often underplayed in scenarios
like Tara O’Toole’s “Dark Winter” and “Atlantic Storm,” where the
rates of contagion used are often significantly higher than those in
historical cases of natural outbreaks (71).
DISCUSSION
We have identified a number of assumptions that underlie pol-
icy discourse on the biosecurity threat posed by synthetic biology.
We characterize these assumptions as “myths” that pervade dis-
cussion on this issue and have identified important challenges to
those myths. In particular, we argue that the myths overlook sig-
nificant difficulties faced when seeking to design and/or produce
a pathogen because they focus mostly on material features, thus
missing important socio-technical factors, such as tacit knowledge.
We have also shown that this dominant narrative underestimates
a crucial step needed to mount a terrorist attack, especially a mass
attack: the need to produce weapons, not just pathogens. Thus, we
conclude that the five myths that recur in the dominant narrative
embody misleading assumptions about both synthetic biology and
bioterrorism.
The purpose of identifying and challenging these “myths” is
not to dismiss the threat of a bioweapons attack. Of course, it
is prudent to take measures to prepare against the possibility of
a biological weapons attack and concerted action across a policy
continuum that extends from prevention through preparedness
to consequence management is necessary. However, as we have
demonstrated, any bioterrorism attack will most likely be one
using a pathogen strain with less than optimal characteristics
disseminated through crude delivery methods under imperfect
conditions, and the potential casualties of such an attack are likely
to be much lower than the mass casualty scenarios frequently por-
trayed. This is not to say that speculative thinking should be dis-
counted as it can, in some policy contexts, be helpful to represent
possible, though not necessarily probable, future scientific devel-
opments, in order to encourage thinking on long-term security
challenges. However, problems arise when these speculative sce-
narios for the future are distorted and portrayed as scientific reality
in the present, which, as this paper demonstrates, has occurred in
policy narratives related to synthetic biology and biosecurity.
We have shown that much of the debate in policy forums about
the biosecurity threat of synthetic biology is based on naïve and
simplistic interpretations of synthetic biology’s ability to “make
biology easier to engineer,” and in particular on the misleading
assumption that the skills and knowledge necessary to perform
synthetic biology will necessarily become accessible to people with
no specialist expertise working outside professional scientific insti-
tutions, including hostile actors who would seek to misuse the
technology to develop biological weapons.
In order to understand why such myths develop and persist, it is
important to consider the role that they play in the social dynamics
of synthetic biology. Drawing on the literature in the sociology of
expectations (72), we suggest that particular portrayals of synthetic
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biology are mobilized by various actors – deliberately or not –
to strengthen their own perspectives and interests, and to help
bring into being their own “hoped-for” future. The myths act as
“prospecting retrospects”: prospects that are deployed in the real-
time now, in order to construct particular futures (72). Discourses
about the future are performative, meaning that they “perform”
functions (they “do work”) and are also relational, meaning that
they bind together and enroll actors and other resources into
networks (73). Thus, discourse is “wishful enactment” not just
“wishful thinking” (74).
With respect to synthetic biology, different communities of
actors stress particular issues in particular contexts. This frames
the debate in particular ways and plays an important role in con-
structing and maintaining resources and support for each of these
communities. For example, scientists such as Rob Carlson, George
Church, or Drew Endy, who are heavily engaged in the promo-
tion of synthetic biology, need to portray an optimistic vision of
the potential of the engineering approach to biology as part of
their endeavors to develop support for a new field of research
which they believe has great significance and potential. Actors in
the security field (including some policy makers, social scientists,
and natural scientists) play a different role and often exaggerate
the “dual-use threat” in order to attract attention and resources
to their own work. Researchers from our own field of science and
technology studies (STS) are not immune from such processes:
we will generally seek to emphasize the complexity of real world
situations and the importance of social dimensions of science, in
order to justify the need for our expertise. However, at least until
now, STS framings have had less influence on the dominant nar-
rative than the discourse mobilized by actors from the fields of
synthetic biology and biosecurity. Thus, the myths we have dis-
cussed in this paper have played an important role in defining
synthetic biology as a “promissory” field of research and as an
“emerging science and technology” in need of scenario forecast-
ing, regulation and governance. Our aim is not to denigrate the
behavior of those who deploy these narratives. Rather, we sug-
gest that when discourse is understood as something that seeks to
change the social world, we can move beyond the battle that we
have regularly encountered in discussions about synthetic biology,
that focuses on whose prognosis is most accurate and whether or
not “it is just hype” (19, 20).
We believe that a better understanding and acknowledgment
of the social dynamics at play would help to develop more pro-
ductive discussions in which the different communities involved
could move beyond simply promoting their own interests and per-
spectives. This is important because in some cases the discourse
deployed can have unintended consequences that are detrimen-
tal to the interests of the actors themselves, and to the nature of
public debate. Thus, overstating the“promise”of synthetic biology
applications manifestly leads to parallel overstatements about the
“perils” of the field: the promissory discourse of synthetic biol-
ogy is bolstered by the “promised peril” of misuse by malevolent
actors. The fact that these myths (or at least the first 4) serve to
bolster the positive promises of synthetic biology helps to explain
why these myths continue to persist, despite the fact that they do
not accurately reflect current or foreseeable realities for the prac-
tice of synthetic biology. This is somewhat incongruous since the
hoped-for futures of the actors who promote the benevolent devel-
opment of synthetic biology do not, of course, include large-scale
fatal bioterrorist attacks.
If we are to disentangle synthetic biology and biosecurity
concerns, and to have a more refined assessment of both the
biosecurity threat and the anticipated benefits, we believe that it
is necessary to have more nuanced discussions about the extent to
which synthetic biology is, or ever will be, an engineering disci-
pline, and whether, in practice, this would reduce the importance
of tacit knowledge, specialist expertise of different kinds, collec-
tive work, large infrastructures, and organizational factors. Such
discussions would need to identify those aspects of the work that
would become easier – in the sense that they can, for example, be
automated and reliably performed by a robot – and those which
are likely to remain difficult, in the sense that they still require
craft skills to be successfully achieved. This would need to take
into account not only the material and informational aspects but
also other important socio-technical dimensions that will shape
the development of the field.
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